Abstract We study a differential game where two players separately control their own dynamics, pay a running cost, and moreover pay an exit cost (quitting the game) when they leave a fixed domain. In particular, each player has its own domain and the exit cost consists of three different exit costs, depending whether either the first player only leaves its domain, or the second player only leaves its domain, or they both simultaneously leave their own domain. We prove that, under suitable hypotheses, the lower and upper value are continuous and are, respectively, the unique viscosity solution of a suitable Dirichlet problem for a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation. The continuity of the values relies on the existence of suitable non-anticipative strategies respecting the domain-constraint. This problem is also treated in this work.
in the framework of dynamic programming methods and viscosity solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. By system governed by thermostatic dynamics, here we mean an equation as y ′ = f (y, w, α) where α is the measurable control and w ∈ {−1, 1} is the output of a hysteretical thermostat (delayed relay) subject to the evolution of some suitable components of the state-variable y. Hence, the switching evolution of the parameter w is not directly at disposal of the external controller, but it follows some internal switching rules which are intrinsic to the system. In [1, 3] , the value function is proven to be the unique viscosity solution of a suitably coupled system of HJB equations, where the coupling is given by the boundary conditions in the regions where the thermostat certainly assumes a constant value (cannot switch). This is done by splitting the optimal control problem in some problems of exit time kind: in every space-region where the thermostat is constant, the problem is equivalent to an exit-time problem with unknown exit-cost given by the value function itself evaluated in the other region of constancy for w. Then, an ad hoc fixed point procedure is applied. Hence, a crucial starting point for such a procedure is a good theory for exit-time/exit-costs optimal control problems, in particular for what concerns the identification of the value function as the unique viscosity solution of a Dirichlet problem for HJB equations with suitable boundary conditions. Fortunately, such a good theory was quite already at disposal.
In [1, 3, 4] some motivations and applications for studying optimal control problems with thermostatic dynamics are given. Similar motivations certainly suggest the study of differential games with thermostatic dynamics. Just think to a pursuit evasion game between two cars with automatic gears, where the switching variable(s) w may represent the position of the gears. We also point out that such thermostatic dynamics is a special case of a so-called hybrid dynamics, and we refer to Gromov-Gromova [19] , for a recent study of hybrid differential games in the framework of necessary optimality conditions. In order to apply to differential games some similar procedures as the ones applied to HJB for thermostatic optimal control problems, we need a good theory for exit time differential games. Unfortunately, for differential games, the situation is rather different than from optimal control: differential games problem with exit-time and exit-costs are not so well studied in the framework of viscosity solutions for Hamilton-Jacobi equations. Hence, before studying differential games for systems with thermostatic dynamics we need first, at least, a uniqueness results for some suitable Dirichlet problems for HamiltonJacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equations, in order to be able to identify the (upper and lower) values of the exit-time differential game as the unique viscosity solutions. Up to the knowledge of the authors, this paper may represent the first attempt of studying an exit-time differential games in the framework of viscosity solutions theory for Isaacs equations with boundary conditions in the viscosity sense. The possible applications to a differential games with thermostatic dynamics will be the subject of a future work. However, we would like to point out that the differential games with exit-time and exit-costs are interest-ing by themselves, and not only for applications to thermostatic dynamics. To this purpose, we are going to give an example at the end of the next section.
The studied problem is the following one. We are given the controlled system X ′ (t) = f X(t), α(t) , t > 0, X(0) = x ∈ Ω X , Y ′ (t) = g Y (t), β(t) , t > 0,
with α and β controls, X and Y state-variables for the two players, respectively. The closed sets Ω X and Ω Y (closure of the open ones Ω X and Ω Y ) are respectively the sate-space for X and Y . Denoting by τ X and τ Y the first exittime from Ω X and Ω Y respectively, we define τ = min{τ X , τ Y }, and consider the following integral discounted cost J(x, y, α, β) = τ 0 e −λt ℓ(X(t), Y (t), α(t), β(t))dt + e −λτ ψ(X(τ ), Y (τ )),
where, in particular, the exit-cost ψ : ∂(Ω X × Ω Y ) → [0, +∞[ is a given function, which is not required to be continuous but only separately continuous on ∂Ω X ×Ω Y , Ω X ×∂Ω Y and ∂Ω X ×∂Ω Y . Player X wants to minimize the cost whereas player Y wants to maximize. The problem has then a pursuit-evasion structure.
The "weak" continuity hypothesis on the exit-cost ψ is assumed in order to take account of the possible application to the thermostatic case. Indeed, in that case, Ω X and Ω Y represent two regions where the thermostats (one per every player) assume constant values. Hence the first exit-time represent the first switching time for the thermostat, and so exiting from ∂Ω X × Ω Y means that only the thermostat of X switches, exiting from Ω X × ∂Ω Y means that only the thermostat of Y switches and finally exiting from ∂Ω X × ∂Ω Y means that both thermostats switch. In every one of such three cases the new scenario of the game (which continues to run after switching) may be completely different and not related to each other.
There are three main points which are going to treat in this paper: a) continuity of the lower and upper value, b) derivation of suitable boundary conditions for the corresponding HJI equations, c) uniqueness results for those Dirichlet problems, in the sense of viscosity solutions.
We refer the reader to Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5] for a comprehensive account to viscosity solutions theory and applications to optimal control problems and differential games (for differential games see also Buckdahn-CardaliaguetQuincampoix [13] ) Point a) comes from the arguments of Sections 3, 4 and 7. The lower and upper value are respectively defined as
where γ and ξ are non-anticipative strategies in the sense of Elliot-Kalton [16] . They are functions from the set of controls for one player to the set of controls of the other one, which do not depend on the future behavior of the control. After a necessary suitable compatibility assumptions on the exit cost (see (4) and Remark 2), the main problem concerning the continuity of the values is the existence of suitable "constrained non-anticipative strategies". Simplifying (see Assumption 2 for more precise details), this means that, for example, for every non-anticipative strategy γ for player X, there exists a non-anticipative strategyγ for X such that, for every control β for Y , the controlγ[β] makes the evolution of X remain inside Ω X as long as β makes the evolution of Y remaining inside Ω Y , and the cost paid by the couple of controls (γ[β], β) is not so different from the cost paid by the couple (γ[β], β). The difficult here is to construct such a (constrained) non-anticipative strategyγ. Indeed this problem is the same that occurs in the case of constrained optimal control problems, where the trajectory is constrained to remain inside a fixed set for all the times. In Soner [21] , starting from any control, a way for constructing a constrained control with properties similar to the ones required forγ is given. The main assumption is the controllability on the boundary of the set (which we also assume). However, in that paper, the construction of the constrained control is definitely done in an "anticipating" way, that is at time t the new control is constructed taking also account of the behavior of the old control for suitable times after t. In the case of non-anticipative strategies a similar construction is forbidden. In the present paper, using the fact that the dynamics of the two players (but not the cost) are decoupled with respect to the spacevariables and to the controls (see (1)), we are able to suitably adapt Soner's construction in order to get the desired constrained non-anticipating strategy. Such assumptions on decoupled dynamics, at the present moment, seems almost necessary in order to get this kind of results. In Section 7 we actually assume a sort of more general weak decoupling of the dynamics with respect to the controls (see (20) ) and we still get the desired constrained non-anticipating strategy. However, that weak decoupling seems to be not immediately suitable for the results of Sections 5 and 6. The same problem of constructing that kind of non-anticipating strategy is also studied in Bettiol-CardaliaguetQuincapoix [7] , where the decoupled dynamics assumption is also used, and other hypotheses on the running cost are made. In that paper the authors are also interested in the so-called W 1,1 estimates on the trajectories. Other studies on constrained trajectories and non-anticipative strategies as well as on possible relations with optimal control problems and differential games can be found in Koike [20] , Bardi-Koike-Soravia [6] , Cardaliaguet-Quincampoix-Saint Pierre [14] , Bettiol-Bressan-Vinter [9, 8] , Bressan-Facchi [12] , Bettiol-Facchi [10] , Bettiol-Frankowska-Vinter [11] and Frankowska-Marchini-Mazzola [18] . Point b) is treated in Section 5. In that section, using the Dynamic Programming Principle, we prove that V and V are viscosity solutions of the corresponding HJI equation with suitable boundary conditions in the viscosity sense. As expected, such boundary conditions are determined by the exit costs on the boundary. However, in our formulation of the differential game, we are considering different exist costs, depending on which of the two players is exiting (in a state-constraint framework: which of the two players is violating the constraint). This is an important feature of a state-constraint differential game, and hence of an exit-time differential game. Which player is in charge in order to respect the constraint? Which player must be penalized when the constraint is violated? When the dynamics are not decoupled such questions have no evident answers, they may depend on the particular model under analysis. However, even if the game has a zero-sum structure (min-max), the definition of the right players' responsibility with respect to the constraint is almost always not of that kind. In our case, the dynamics are decoupled and we have different exit costs and these facts allow to rightly assign the responsibility of exit from the constraint. The compatibility condition (4) helps to write a coherent and useful boundary condition for HJI. It says that, on the common boundary, the exit costs for the maximizing player is not larger than the cost of the minimizing one.
Point c) is treated in Section 6 where we show uniqueness of V and V as viscosity solution of the corresponding Dirichlet problem for the upper and lower HJI, respectvely. This is done by a rather standard double-variable technique for proving a comparison result between sub-and super-solutions, where the boundary conditions must be treated in a non standard way. The player X uses the measurable control α and governs the state variable X(t) ∈ R n . On the other hand, the player Y uses the measurable control β and governs the state variable Y (t) ∈ R m .
We are also given of a suitably regular running cost ℓ :
e. bounded, continuous and Lipschitz continuous with respect to the state-variables (its first two entries) uniformly with respect to the controls (its second two entries)) and of three suitably regular exit costs (i.e. bounded and continuous)
which respectively represent the costs for the exit of X only (from Ω X ), for the exit of Y only (from Ω Y ) and for the simultaneous exit of X and Y . Finally we have a discount factor λ > 0.
When a control α is fixed, we define the corresponding trajectory of the first system in (1) as X(·; x, α); similarly we use the notation Y (·; y, β). We define the first exit time of X from Ω X as τ X (x, α) = inf t ≥ 0 X(t; x, α) ∈ Ω X , and, similarly, the first exit time of Y from Ω Y as
with the convention inf ∅ = +∞. Moreover, dropping, whenever possible, the heavier notation τ (x, y, α, β), we use the notation τ = inf(τ X (x, α), τ Y (y, β)) .
We consider the following cost functional J, defined on
where
The game consists in the fact that player X wants to minimize the cost J and the player Y wants to maximize J.
We define the sets of the nonanticipative strategies for both players: i) strategies for X:
ii) strategies for Y :
We then define the lower and the upper value functions, V and V respectively:
We say that the game has a value if
One of the possible interesting motivations/applications of differential games with exit cost can be seen in the so-called surge tank problem, as described in Vinter-Clark [22] , and in Falugi-Kountouriotis-Vinter [17] . Surge tanks are flow control devices, whose purpose is to prevent flow rate fluctuations for fluids passing from one process unit to another one. In [22, 17] the authors, using a method given by Dupuis-McEneaney [15] , regard the problem as a differential game, involving dynamics with two players X and Y , where the objective of the X-player is to keep the state within a specified safe region, despite the best efforts of the Y -player to drive the state out of this region. The dynamic equations of an ideal surge tank are
where x 1 and x 2 can be identified with the volume and rate of change of volume of fluid in the tank respectively, α is the control which regulates the rate of change of outflow and β is the disturbance. A possible upper game is given by sup α∈A inf β∈B τ 0
where τ denotes the first exit time from a suitable open set. The X player wants to maximize the cost (to maintain the state in the safe region), whereas Y wants to minimize. Note that here the dynamics are not decoupled, however, if the disturbance enters the system in a "bounded manner", then this case can be casted in the situation assumed in Section 7. In [22, 17] the authors are interested in bang-bang controls and in the decomposition of the problem into a collection of one player optimal control problems.
Controllability
In the next section, we are going to give some regularity results and properties of the value functions. Of course, suitable, but general, hypotheses are needed. First of all, we assume a controllability hypothesis on the boundaries. Assumption 1. For every x ∈ ∂Ω X there exist two constant controls a 1 , a 2 ∈ A such that f (x, a 1 ) is strictly entering in Ω X and f (x, a 2 ) is strictly entering in R m \ Ω X . This means that there exists c > 0 such for every 0 < δ ≤ c it is x + δf (x, a 1 ) ∈ Ω X and x + δf (x, a 2 ) ∈ R n \ Ω X . Similarly, for every
Such a controllability hypothesis is essential for having the continuity of the value functions. In particular, it is linked to the existence of suitable constrained non-anticipative strategy. Indeed, the continuity of the value functions for the exit-time case presents similar features as the case of state-constrained. When we evaluate, for instance, the difference V (x 1 , y 1 ) − V (x 2 , y 2 ) we need, for instance, the possibility of driving the state X(·; ·, x 1 ) in such a way that it remains inside Ω X untill the state X(·; ·, x 2 ) stays inside Ω X . This must be done in a way such that the variation of the cost is controlled, but the main difficulty here is the fact that it must be done in a non-anticipative way.
Assumption 2. For every T > 0, for every K ⊆ Ω X × Ω Y compact, there exists a function O, infinitesimal as its argument tends to zero, such that: I) for every (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ K, for every γ ∈ Γ there existsγ ∈ Γ and for every β ∈ B there existsβ ∈ B such that,
is the integral of the discounted running cost up to the time min(τ , T ). II) A similar condition holds reversing the role of X and Y , γ ∈ Γ and ξ ∈ χ, α ∈ A and β ∈ B. Assumption 2 is required in order to guarantee the existence of a suitable non-anticipative strategies and then prove the continuity of the values. Under our hypotheses, in particular the decoupling of the dynamics, and the controllability on the boundaries, Assumption 2 holds, as it is proven in BettiolCardaliaguet-Quincampoix [7] . More precisely, i), iv) and v) are treated in Proposition 3.1 and of vi) in Proposition 2.3 of [7] . On the other hand, conditions ii) and iii) just says that the constructed trajectories do not exit before the given ones. In Section 7 we are going to give a different proof of the validity of Assumption 2, modifying, in a non-anticipative manner, the proof of Soner [21] for the construction of constrained controls.
The lower and the upper value functions
By standard calculations (see for example Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5] ), V and V satisfies the usual Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP). For example, for every t ≥ 0
We now assume that (see Remark 2 for comments on it)
Proposition 1 Given Assumption 1, Assumption 2, hypothesis (4) (and the usual regularity assumptions on the dynamics and running costs), the value functions are continuous in
Proof. We only prove the continuity of the lower value V . We fix δ > 0 and take T > 0 such that, for every trajectories and controls, +∞ T e −λt ℓdt + e −λT ψ ≤ δ/2, where ψ is any one of the exit costs. Let K ′ ⊆ K ⊆ Ω X × Ω Y be two compact sets such that K contains all the possible trajectories starting from points of K ′ and running inside Ω X and Ω Y respectively, in a time interval not greater than [0, T ]. In the sequel,γ andβ are the ones defined in Assumption 2, and by O we denote any infinitesimal function as its argument tends to zero, the one given in Assumption 2 as well as any other possible one. We then take (
where b ∈ B is such that the dynamics g(·, b) makes Y (τ Y (y 1 , β); y 2 ,β) rapidly exit from Ω Y . Here, by "rapidly exit" we mean that b is the one given by Assumption 1 which makes g outward pointing in Y (τ Y (y 1 , β); y 1 , β) ∈ ∂Ω Y . In this way, if y 1 and y 2 are sufficiently close, due to the compactness in time (T ) and in space (K) and to the Lipschitz continuity of g, using the control β, starting from y 2 , we exit from Ω Y with exit time satisfying 0
, with O only depending from K ′ and T . Note that, by our hypotheses, such a construction of β is non-anticipating. Similarly, for every γ ∈ Γ , we define γ ∈ Γ such that, for every β ∈ B and
where, as before, a ∈ A is such that
, with O as above. Note that, by our hypotheses, γ ∈ Γ , that is γ is non-anticipating. Moreover, for every γ ∈ Γ , we also consider the following non-anticipating strategy γ ∈ Γ , defined as
Now, for suitable γ 2 ∈ Γ and β 1 ∈ B, by definition of infimum and supremum, we have β 1 ) ). Hence we have
We analyze Ψ 1 and Ψ 2 . Of course, we may restrict to the case τ 12 < T . Let us fix ε > 0. We have some cases. a)
Hence, if x 1 and x 2 are sufficiently close,
, and so
Hence we have (here we use (4))
If y 2 and y 1 are sufficiently close, then
Putting together all these cases, we get
By the arbitrariness of K ′ , δ and of (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ K ′ , we get the continuity of V .
⊓ ⊔ Remark 2 Note that, whenever hypothesis (4) is not satisfied, then the continuity is not guaranteed. For example, if ψ X < ψ Y on ∂Ω X × ∂Ω Y , then, using also the controllability hypothesis on the boundaries, we can approximate points on ∂Ω X × ∂Ω Y by points in ∂Ω X × Ω Y and by points in Ω X × ∂Ω Y where, respectively, V ≤ ψ X and V ≥ ψ Y . And this fact makes immediately fail the continuity of V on points of ∂Ω X × ∂Ω Y .
5 The lower and the upper Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations and boundary conditions
For every (x, y) ∈ Ω X × Ω Y and for every (p, q) ∈ R n × R m , we introduce the Upper Hamiltonian
In the sequel, for a function u, u x (x, y) and u y (x, y) will denote the gradient with respect to x and with respect to y, respectively.
Theorem 3 Given all the hypotheses of the previous sections (in particular controllability and (4)), the lower value V satisfies the following (upper) problem in the viscosity sense (here expressed for a generic function u :
By solutions in the viscosity sense we mean the following: let ϕ ∈ C 1 (Ω X × Ω Y ) and (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ Ω X × Ω Y , then the following facts i) and ii) hold true: i) if (x 0 , y 0 ) is a point of local maximum for u−ϕ, with respect to Ω X ×Ω Y , then we have the following four implications (one per every line)
ii) if (x 0 , y 0 ) is a point of local minimum for u−ϕ, with respect to Ω X ×Ω Y , then we have the following four implications (one per every line)
If u satisfies i) is said to be a subsolution, if it satisfies ii) is said to be a supersolution.
Note that, in the formulation of (5), the intermediate exit cost ψ XY does not play any role. We refer the reader to Remark 6 for more details on this fact.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let us note that, by our hypothesis of controllability on the boundaries, we have the following inequalities
Hence, for the subsolution case, we only need to prove the Isaacs equation in Ω X × Ω Y , the boundary condition on Ω X × ∂Ω Y and the boundary condition on ∂Ω X × ∂Ω Y for only the case ψ Y < V < ψ X . In the same way, for the supersolution case, we only need to prove the Isaacs equation in Ω X × Ω Y , the boundary condition on ∂Ω X × Ω Y and the boundary condition on ∂Ω X × ∂Ω Y for only the case ψ X > V > ψ Y . Since the validity of the Isaacs equation in Ω X × Ω Y is standard (see for instance Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5] ), we only concentrate on the boundary conditions. Supersolution. Let (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ ∂Ω X × Ω Y be of minimum for V − ϕ, and by absurd hypothesis, let us suppose that
Of course, it is not restrictive to suppose that V (x 0 , y 0 ) = ϕ(x 0 , y 0 ) and that λ = 1. Also using this assumption, we have that, for some ε > 0, and for every (x, y) ∈ B((x 0 , y 0 ), ε) ∩ Ω X × Ω Y (here B((x, y), r) stays for a ball of R n × R m with center in (x, y) and radius r > 0)
Moreover, we can also suppose that y ∈ Ω Y for all (x, y) ∈ B((x 0 , y 0 ), ε). Now, let t > 0 be such that, for every γ ∈ Γ and β ∈ B, (X(s; x, γ[β]), Y (s; y, β)) ∈ B((x 0 , y 0 ), ε) for all (x, y) ∈ B((x 0 , y 0 ), ε/2), for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t. Let us define δ = ε(1 − e −t )/2 > 0 and take γ ∈ Γ such that, by DPP, for any β ∈ B,
In particular, we can take β ≡ b, with b ∈ B arbitrary. Note that we can certainly suppose that 0 < t < τ X (x 0 , γ[β]) for all β. Indeed, if not, we would have for a sequence t n → 0 + (and also δ n → 0 
from which, by the arbitrariness of b ∈ B, we get the contradiction
Let us now consider the case (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ ∂Ω X × ∂Ω Y . We only have the case ψ Y (x 0 , y 0 ) < V (x 0 , y 0 ) < ψ X (x 0 , y 0 ), and we can again restrict ourselves to the case 0 < t < min{τ Y , τ X }, and then, arguing as before, we get the conclusion.
Subsolution. We only treat the case (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ Ω X × ∂Ω Y of maximum for V − ϕ. Let us take ε, t > 0 and δ > 0 in a similar way as before (changing the role of ∂Ω X and of ∂Ω Y ). For every a ∈ A (and so for every constant strategies γ ≡ a) we find β ∈ B such that 0 < t < τ Y (y 0 , β) independently on a (otherwise we get the contradiction V (x 0 , y 0 ) ≤ ψ Y (x 0 , y 0 )) and
Hence, for every a ∈ A, we get
from which the contradiction (by the arbitrariness of a ∈ A)
⊓ ⊔

Remark 4
In the same way, under the same hypotheses, and with the same definitions, we can prove that the upper value function V is a viscosity solution of
Uniqueness
We need the following inner-cone hypothesis on the regularity of boundaries. There exist two uniformly continuous functions η X : ∂Ω X → R n , η Y : ∂Ω Y → R m , and two positive numbers c, d such that, for all x ∈ ∂Ω X , y ∈ ∂Ω Y and for all s ∈]0, d],
Theorem 5 Standing all the hypotheses as before (in particular Lipschitz continuity of dynamics, controllability, (4) and (9)), the lower value V (respectively, the upper value function V ) is the unique bounded and continuous function on Ω X × Ω Y which is a viscosity solution of (5) (respectively, of (8)).
Proof. We only prove uniqueness for (5) among continuous and bounded functions, from which the theorem because V is a continuous and bounded viscosity solution. As usual, we prove such a uniqueness result by proving a comparison result between sub-and supersolutions, and we will refer to the standard double variable technique, and in particular to the "constrained" double variable technique of Soner (see Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5] pages 278-281) Let u, v : Ω X × Ω Y → R be two bounded and continuous sub-and supersolution, respectively. We are going to prove that u ≤ v on Ω X × Ω Y .
By contradiction, let us suppose
and take δ > 0 and (
We only treat the boundary case (
The other cases are similar or easier. We take ε > 0 and, for every one of the following cases, we consider a suitable "double variable" function φ :
with bounded gradient and such that ζ(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 and that ζ → +∞ when (x, y) → +∞, and µ > 0 is a constant whose value will be fixed later.
(13) Note the differences: from φ a to φ b : in all penalizing terms the role of indexes 1 and 2 are mutually exchanged; from φ a to φ c : in the second penalizing terms the role of indexes 1 and 2 are mutually exchanged. This means that, when performing the usual double variable technique for comparison results, for suitable test functions ϕ, in the case a) we are going to detach maxima for u − ϕ (i.e. (x 1 , y 1 ) ) from the boundary; in the case b) we are going to detach minima for v − ϕ (i.e. (x 2 , y 2 )) from the boundary; in the case c) we are going to detach the x-component of the maxima for u − ϕ (i.e. x 1 ) and the y-component of the minima for v − ϕ (i.e. y 2 ) from the boundary. We briefly treat some of the above cases. a) By our absurd hypothesis, and by the hypothesis on ζ, we have that φ a has a maximum in (
) be a point of maximum. By standard estimates, we get that, if ε is sufficiently small,
. Hence both equation inequalities hold in (6) and in (7) for u and v respectively, when tested with suitable test functions obtained from φ a . We then get the usual contradiction. The points ii), iii) and iv) are similarly treated.
) is a point of maximum for φ b then for possible small ε we obtain
i) The hypothesis v(x 0 , y 0 ) ≥ ψ X (x 0 , y 0 ) and our absurd hypothesis imply u(x 0 , y 0 ) > ψ X (x 0 , y 0 ) and so u(x
, for small ε.Hence both equation inequalities hold in (6) and in (7) for u and v respectively, when tested with suitable test functions obtained from φ b . We then get the usual contradiction. The points ii) and iii) are similarly treated.
) is a point of maximum for φ c , we obtain, for possible small ε,
The hypothesis v(x 0 , y 0 ) = ψ Y (x 0 , y 0 ) and our absurd hypothesis imply that, for small ε, u(x
. For a seek of completeness, we show here the calculation for this case. In particular, let us note that in this case we are not detaching from the boundary both points of maximum and of minimum, which is in general not possible, but instead we are detaching the first n components of the point of maximum and the second m components of the point of minimum. And this is possible because the domain
where M is a bound for η x and for η Y (and also for |u| and |v|, in subsequent calculations). By the coercivity of ζ and the boundedness of u and v we get that φ c reaches its maximum in a point ((x
2 )) and that there exists two compact subsets (depending on µ) K
where C > 0 is a suitable constant independent from ε. Now, we have both inequalities
From the definition of φ c and from (14), we get
By the boundedness of ω µ when its argument is the distance of points in (16) we get (for another constant independent from ε, and still denoted by C)
which, again by (16) and for another C > 0 independent from ε, gives
By the inward cone hypothesis (9) , from (18) , in a standard way, we get, for sufficiently small δ and ε,
Now, since we are in the case v(x 0 , y 0 ) = ψ Y (x 0 , y 0 ) < ψ X (x 0 , y 0 ) and since u(x 0 , y 0 ) > v(x 0 , y 0 ), by (17)- (18) we can suppose that
This, together with (19) and the definition of ((x (7) respectively, when we take as test functions
respectively. We have
and then, if µ is sufficiently small, we can conclude in the standard way getting the conclusion by contradiction to (10) . ⊓ ⊔
Remark 6
As already remarked, the exit cost ψ XY , for simultaneous exit of X and Y , does not play any role in the formulation of the Isaacs problem (5). Indeed, it can never happen that the simultaneous exit cost ψ XY is a "good" choice for both players (i.e. an equilibrium) without being already equal to ψ X or to ψ Y or to V δ int for some δ > 0 where the latter is defined as the lower value function restricted to controls β and to non-anticipative strategies γ which make Y and X remain inside Ω Y and Ω X for times in [0, δ], respectively. For instance, let us suppose that, in a point (x, y) ∈ ∂Ω X × ∂Ω Y , we have
Then, player II (the maximizing one) has certainly no interest in exit, and so the "really paid cost" is ψ X or V δ int . A similar conclusion holds for the case
In the case that ψ XY = V δ int is a "good choice" for both players, then dynamic programming leads to the Isaacs equation and so the exit cost ψ XY does not really influence the problem.
By the way, even in a strategic static minmax game where two players may independently choose to "stay" or to "exit" and the first player wants to minimize, if the utility u(exit, exit) stays between the utilities u(stay, exit) ≤ u(exit, stay), then the choice (exit, exit) is never a Nash equilibrium, whichever u(stay, stay) is.
Remark 7
Since the dynamics are decoupled, in order to have the classical Isaacs' condition for the existence of a value of the game (see for example Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5] ), we only need some further hypotheses on the running cost ℓ. The simplest one is that it is also decoupled with respect to controls. In this case the two Hamiltonians U H and LH are the same and hence, by uniqueness of the corresponding Dirichlet problems (5), (8), V = V .
On constrained non-anticipative strategies
We give a construction of non-anticipative strategies which respect the stateconstraint and satisfies Assumption 2. We follow Soner [21] (see also BardiCapuzzo Dolcetta [5] , pages 272-274) whose construction of a suitable constrained control is not non-anticipative. Here we modify that construction in a non-anticipative way.
We are now considering point I) of Assumption 2, point II) being similar. Note that point I) is concerning with non-anticipative strategies γ ∈ Γ for player X. With respect to (1), we are going to relax a little bit the hypotheses of decoupled dynamics and we are going to consider the following hypothesis: the dynamics f is affine with respect to the controls (coherently with BettiolCardialaguet-Quincampoix [7] ) and "weakly" depends on the control of Y . This means that (we use the same notation f for two different functions)
′ is a matrix such that DB ⊆ A is a compact set. However, note that such a weak dependence of f from the control of the Y -player seems to be not immediately suitable for the theorems in Sections 5 and 6.
Assumption 3. For every x ∈ ∂Ω X there exist two constant controls a 1 , a 2 ∈ A such that f (x, a 1 , b) is strictly entering in Ω X and f (x, a 2 , b) is strictly entering in R m \ Ω X ∀b ∈ B.
Assuming regularity of ∂Ω X , by Assumption 3, and the weak decoupling (20) , for every compact K, there is ζ > 0 and a ∈ A such that, for any
where ξ(x) is the inward normal unit vector to Ω X at x ∈ ∂Ω X . In what follows, in view of possible future applications to thermostatically switching systems, we assume that the boundaries of Ω X and Ω Y are hyperplanes passing through the origin, and that Ω X and Ω Y are just one of the two semi-space defined by the hyperplane. In this way, the unit vector inward normal ξ is constant on ∂Ω X (as well as on ∂Ω Y , in the sequel denoted by the same letter ξ). However, everything done here can be easily generalized to the case in which the boundaries of Ω X and Ω Y are finite intersections of hyperplanes and not passing through the origin (see for example what done in Bagagiolo-Bardi [2] ). Moreover it can be extended to more general regular domains. We have to prove the sub-points of Assumption 2. i), iii) and v). Take T > 0 , and take T ≥ t * Y > 0 to be fixed later on and y 1 , y 2 ∈ K ⊆ Ω Y compact, and define
where (r) + = max(r, 0) is the positive part, and ξ is the unit internal normal to Ω Y . Note that, since Ω Y is a semi-space, the quantity inside the suprema is just the maximal distance from Ω Y reached by the trajectory starting from y 2 with control β, before that the trajectory starting from y 1 with the same control β exits from Ω Y , or the time t * Y is reached. Observe that (22) is different from the one defined by Soner [21] since here we are building non-anticipative strategies, and this feature is guaranteed by the supremum over β in definition (22) . Note that we have the estimate (with C depending only on T , K, and
Indeed, for every β and for every 0
and hence (23) holds. Now, take β ∈ B, let t 0Y ≥ 0 be the first time the trajectory Y (·) := Y (·; y 2 , β) hits the boundary ∂Ω Y and let b 0 ∈ B be such that g(Y (t 0Y ), b 0 ) strictly enters in Ω Y as in Assumption 1. Now, let us take k Y > 0 and define the measurable controlβ ∈ B as
It is evident that, by our definition of ε Y , such a construction ofβ is nonanticipating, in the sense that, whenever β 1 = β 2 in [0, t] a.e., then alsoβ 1 =β 2 in [0, t] a.e., that is i). Now we want to suitably choose t * Y and k Y such that, for every t ∈ [0, t * Y ], it is Y (t; y 2 ,β) ∈ Ω Y , at least for t ≤ τ Y (y 1 , β). This can be done just following Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5] page 273, with ε given by our ε Y . Repeating the construction for every needed time-interval [nt * Y , (n+1)t * Y ], we get iii). Finally, using (23), we also get v).
ii) and iv). Take T > 0, and take T ≥ t * X to be fixed later on, x 1 , x 2 ∈ K ⊆ Ω X compact and define, similarly as for ε Y , ε X (β) = sup 
where ξ is the unit internal normal to Ω X . In (26) we use both the supremum over β and over γ in order to build non-anticipative strategies. Note that now, in the notations of the trajectory X and of the exit time τ X we are taking account that the dynamics f is only weakly decoupled (20) . As before, inside the suprema, the scalar product is the distance from the semi-space Ω X . Again, we have (with C depending only on T , K and t * X )
Now, take γ ∈ Γ , and we want to construct the strategyγ. Take β ∈ B and let t 0X ≥ 0 be the first time the trajectory X(·) := X(·; x 1 , γ[β], β) hits the boundary ∂Ω X and let a 0 ∈ A be such that f strictly enters in Ω X as in Assumption 3. Now, let us take k X > 0 and defineγ : B → A as (f (X(s + k X ε X )) − f (X(s)) + Dβ(s + k X ε X ) − Dβ(s)) · ξ ds we have used the Lipschitz continuity of f , standard estimates on trajectories (coming from Gronwall inequality), and the fact that the dynamics is affine in the controls (20) . In particular the following holds for s ≥ t 0X |X(s + k X ε X ) − X(s)| ≤ |X(t 0X + k X ε X ) − X(t 0X )|+
Adding (30) to (31), and using the definition of ε X , we get ξ · X(t) ≥ ζk X ε X − ε X − M k X ε X (e whereC is an upper bound for Db · ξ and ζ −C > 0 by (21) . Consequently, if t * X is sufficiently small, X(t) · ξ ≥ (ζ −C)k X ε X 2 − ε X , and hence, taking k X := 2/(ζ −C), we obtain ξ · X(t) ≥ 0. This proves ii), and iv) is proven in a standard way using (27). vi) We have to estimate For the third integral, we add and subtract ±ℓ(X(t, x 1 ), Y (t, y 1 ), a 0 , b 0 ) and ±ℓ(X(t, x 1 ), Y (t, y 1 ), γ[b 0 ](t), b 0 ). And we similarly proceed for the other integrals.
